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Abstract. Due to extcrnal effects  associated with rainforest conservation, it is likely that  the 
preferred size of rainforcsts is larger from the point of view of the international community than 
from the point of view of those who directly exploit the forests. As trade in tropical timber is the 
main direct link between forest exploitation and the international community, trade policy instru- 
ments have been proposed to promote sustainable forest  exploitation. One  such instrument is 
certification of internationally traded tropical timber: sustainably produced timber is labelled so 
that it becomes distinguishable from unsustainably produced timber. One of the aspects of the 
current debate is the level at which monitoring of compliance to the certification criteria should 
take place, i.e., at the macro (country) level or at the micro (concession) level. There  seems to 
be a consensus that in order to be acceptable for industrialised countries' consumers, monitoring 
and certification should in any case take place at a micro level. However, we argue that in terms 
of maintaining tropical forests a firm level certification regime may be counter-effective  in the 
short and medium run if no macro conditions are included in the certification process as well. 
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1.  Introduction 
During  the  last  two  decades,  the  international  community  has  become 
increasingly aware of the problems associated with the destruction of tropical 
rainforests.  On  a  global  level,  disappearance  of rainforests  inflicts  negative 
external  effects in  terms  of reduced  retention  of greenhouse  gasses  (mainly 
carbon dioxide)and  loss  of biodiversity.  In  tropical countries,  governments 
that own rainforests do not always take these external  effects into  account  in 
their land-use decisions because their prime interest is in the economic benefits 
from forest exploitation accruing to the country. They base their policies on the 
comparison between the economic benefits of forest  conservation  (mainly  the 
possibility to  produce timber not  only today, but also in the future)  and  the 
economic  benefits  of  clearing  forested  land  for  alternative  uses  (mainly 
agriculture). As a  result,  the  optimal  size  of a  country's rainforest area will 
typically be lower from the point of view of governments of tropical countries 
than  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  international  community,  because 
governments of tropical countries are concerned only with the local (economic) 
benefits ofrainforest conservation while the international community also takes 
the global benefits into account. 
This  dichotomy  has  led  to  an  intense  debate  on  the  proper  use  and 
exploitation of the tropical forest as well as other boreal  forests,  On  the  one 
hand, it has been argued that concern about the loss of biodiversity would lead 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  exploitation of tropical forests  should  be  largely 
restrained to  prevent these forests from degrading further.  On  the  other hand, 
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the reasoning has been raised that there is no convincing  argument why  one 
would not  continue  exploiting  the  forests for timber  production  and  for the 
production of non-timber products,  as long as the exploitation is  sustainable. 
Although the latter concept can still  be interpreted in  a wide variety of ways, 
most interpretations boil down to the argument that the exploitation should be 
such that the interests of future generations are consistently taken into  account. 
An additional argument in favour of sustainable exploitation of the forests, next 
to the point that it will produce economic returns for the producers  and  take 
environmental concerns into account, is that many alternatives for timber, such 
as  aluminium  and  plastics,  require  a  large  amount  of  energy  for  their 
production, and are therefore themselves to be considered significant sources of 
pollution of different kinds. 
One instrument now seriously considered to  be  implemented in  order to 
stimulate  forest  conservation  is  tropical  hardwood  certification  for 
internationally  traded  volumes.  For  these  purposes  sustainably  produced 
timber is labelled --  after a careful monitoring and certification process which 
also includes the various chains of custody after harvesting -- so that it can be 
distinguished  from  non-sustainably  produced  timber.  Assuming  consumer 
preferences exist for sustainably produced timber based on environmentalism in 
at least some of the markets in the world, it can be argued that a positive price 
gap (a "green premium") will  arise between certified and non-labelled timber 
on the international market.  This  would  then  create  an  incentive  for timber 
logging  and  trading  firms  to  introduce  or  maintain  sustainable  forest 
management techniques and processes. 
In the discussion about the various details of such a certification regime for 
internationally traded timber, several arguments have been put forward as to the 
level of aggregation  at  which  the  sustainability  required  for the  certification 
should be assessed.  Some would argue that an assessment at the level of the 
timber exporting country or state or province or district would be sufficient to 
decide about whether or not  to  allocate a  certificate to  the  individual  timber 
producers in  the area. After all,  so they argue, it  is the overall forest context 
including  land use planning  and legal and institutional  structure that  matters 
most. Others, instead, argue that if the certificates are to be convincing for the 
final  consumers,  monitoring  would  be  required  at  the  level  of individual 
concessions. Indeed, a consumer would like to know if he/she can be sure that 
a particular piece of timber bought is actually produced in a sustainable manner 
or not;  generalities such as that the timber is  originating from an  area where 
broadly  speaking  the  sustainability  criteria would  be  satisfied  may  not  be 
convincing enough.  As a matter of fact, there seems to be a broad consensus 
that awarding of the certificates and the associated monitoring should primarily 
take place at the micro level, i.e.  at the level of concessions, if the procedure is 
to generate sufficient confidence with the final timber consumers. 
The  general perception in the  consuming  countries  of the  impact on  the 
forests of the  introduction  of such certification schemes  at  the  micro  level  is 
rather positive.  It is believed that if (part  of) the  concessions  are now  being 
managed sustainably, the quality of the forests will - if all other aspects remain 
the same - improve unambiguously, especially because of the conviction that a 
considerable  part  of the  present,  non-sustainable  logging  practices  causes 
serious damage to the  forests.  It is  argued  that  even if many of the  current 
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commercial value are extracted per hectare - the ecological damage can still  be 
substantial  given  the  vulnerability  of the  tropical  forests  ecosystem  (Grut, 
1990;  Lamprecht, 1992;  Myers, 1991  and 1994). 
However,  if a  certification  system  is  introduced  which  only  assesses 
sustainability of tropical forest management at the micro level, this  is  not  to 
say that  the  overall  condition  of the  tropical  forests  will  thus  improve  if 
considered from a macro,  national  or  global  perspective.  The  reason  is  that 
either a certification regime alters the incentive system at the micro level and 
therefore  various  aspects  of  both  sustainable  and  non-sustainable  forest 
management, or because a certification regime has  an  adverse impact on  the 
overall  macro conditions  relevant  for the  forest  condition.  To  illustrate,  if 
various  timber producers  consider  it  not  to  be profitable  for  them  to  start 
sustainably  managed timber production  because the  investment  required  to 
satisfy sustainability  conditions  outweighs the extra return expected from the 
green premium, they will  basically opt out and concentrate on selling on the 
non-certified markets only. Given that the price on these markets may tend to 
decline as the certified products are likely to be sold at the luxury part of the 
market, the final impact of a certification regime may well be that the suppliers 
on  the  non-certified  timber  markets  will  increase  their  volumes  of  non- 
sustainable supply in  order to  at  least  keep  up  with  the  traditional  level  d" 
foreign exchange received by selling their timber abroad. Precisely because they 
opted out,  there is  no incentive for them to produce sustainably,  so  that  the 
overall impact of a certification regime is  a more rapid decline of the tropical 
forest then would otherwise have occurred. Note that the chances that a  serious 
part of the timber producers would opt out will increase the faster a certification 
regime including  a  full  blown  and  tough  interpretation  of the  sustainability 
concept  will  be  introduced;  if  one  would  intend  to  keep  "aboard"  a 
substantially  large fraction of the  potential  producers  on  a  sustainable  basis, 
one might therefore consider to  introduce the certification regime via a phased 
approach which is to say, that the conditions set are gradually tightened on an 
individual  basis  and  via  a  regime  which  enables  feed  back  between  the 
certifying entity and the various concessionaires  during  at  least  a  number  of 
years. 
Another reason why a  certification regime, although successful at the level 
of individual concessions, may well produce a more rapid decline of the forests 
from an overall macro perspective has to do with  the role of the  government 
with regard to  land use planning.  Governments of tropical  forested countries 
typically indicate which areas are to be converted to  alternative  use,  such  as 
agriculture. The government's land use decision process may be affected by the 
introduction  of a  firm  level  certification regime,  insofar as  this  induces  the 
governments to clear larger parts of the forests because they  have the  feeling 
that the need for environmentalism with regard to the forests has already been 
satisfied by the introduction of sustainable timber management practices, or as 
a mere bargaining tactic vis-h-vis the donor community that may consider to 
help the countries to preserve their forests. 
In this paper we aim to explore through a theoretical analysis whether and 
under what circumstances the adoption of a firm level certification regime will 
have beneficial effects  in  terms  of forest conservation.  In  addition,  we  will 
analyse if it is necessary to impose macro conditions next to the sustainability 
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government. The approach will be to analyse the land use decision process of a 
tropical forested country's government, assuming that all individual  firms have 
decided  to  switch  to  sustainable  techniques  and  that  micro  monitoring 
effectively prevents cheating. We will consider both the long-run and short-run 
consequences of certification on forest cover because the larger the rainforest area 
in  each  period,  the  better  the  forests  are  able  to  perform their  ecological 
functions.  It will be shown theoretically that a certification regime may indeed 
lead to some counterintuitive results insofar as its  impact may be more rapid 
forest conversion rather  than  conservation.  In  fact  our  analysis  shows  that 
introducing a firm level certification regime will indeed induce the government 
of a tropical forested country to improve long-run forest conservation, but that 
in  addition  in the short  run,  the  government through  the  newly  established 
certification regime may actually be induced to increase rather than to decrease 
the current rate of deforestation. Through this  a depletion trade-off may arise: 
improved long-run forest protection through certification may go together with 
increased instantaneous rates of deforestation. 
The  set-up  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  In  the  second  section,  the 
consequences  of the  introduction  of a  certification regime  at  the  concession 
level will be considered. It will be argued that the situation at the country level 
is  important as well.  In order to analyse how both concessionaires' decisions 
and government policy interact, in the third section a model will be presented 
of the decision process of a government that aims to maximise national income 
that is derived from different uses of the rainforest area. In the fourth section the 
long-run consequences of introducing  a certification  regime  and  the  resulting 
short-run depletion paths will be derived. This analysis will make clear that in 
the  short-run  deforestation  rates  may  increase after the  implementation  of a 
certification regime,  although  in  the  long  run  cumulative  deforestation  will 
decrease. In the fifth section, the likelihood  of this  depletion trade-off will  be 
explored. Finally, ~zonclusions will be drawn and policy recommendations will 
be proposed to avoid the trade-off. 
2. The decision processes 
The  international  community  (both  governments  and  non-governmental 
organisations)  considers  alternative  ways  of  implementing  a  certification 
regime.  One  of the  most  crucial  decisions  to  be  taken  is  at  what  level 
certificates must  be  awarded.  The  consensus  seems  to  be  that  monitoring 
should take place at the level of the  individual  management unit,  i.e.  at  the 
level of individual  logging  firms:  there  should  be  appropriate incentives  to 
induce  individual  firms  to  apply  environmentally  friendly  production 
techniques.  Furthermore consensus seems to  emerge about the  sustainability 
requirements  that  have to  be  fulfilled.  These  requirements  go  beyond  strict 
guidelines about actual logging techniques: there are ecological, economic and 
social conditions to be satisfied as well. 
That is, given the (limited) information  we currently have on the functions rainforests fulfill on 
Earth. Mainly because of the uncertainty associated with the benefits of forest preservation, a 
conservative approach seems  justified: the higher the long term size of the forest area and the 
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Basically, individual  finns that are confronted with  a  certification regime 
compare the net present value of sustainable logging to the net present value of 
unsustainable logging. The firm faces the following maximisation problem: 
max [NPV(Ps,Cs,ls),NPV(Pu,Ctj,Iu)]  (1) 
The firm's choice whether or not to  apply  sustainable  production techniques 
depends on variables such as the difference between the per unit price at which 
certified timber can be sold (Ps) and the price ofunlabelled timber (Pt~), and the 
extra per  unit  costs  involved in  sustainable  logging  (that  is,  the  difference 
between the extraction costs applying  sustainable  techniques  Cs  and the  per 
unit  costs  of unsustainable  harvesting  Cu).  Furthermore,  the  decision  has 
investment characteristics to it:  for example, meeting certain criteria (such as 
minimum stem size requirements) implies that some harvesting must be post- 
poned  and  that  there  are  also  some  genuine  investment  expenditures  (for 
example to meet the  social  criteria) to  be  made which  are smaller (or even 
absent) if logging is undertaken unsustainably (Is exceeds Iu). This implies that 
also the finn's time horizon plays a role: variables such as the firm's discount 
rate,  the  duration  of the  concession  contract  and  expectations  about  the 
likelihood of renewal are important to the outcome as well. 
Thus, if the costs of meeting the sustainability requirements are more than 
compensated by the difference  between revenues of certified and non-labelled 
tropical timber (given the time horizon of the logging firm), individual firms 
will have a distinct incentive to apply sustainable production techniques. 
Although compliance to certification conditions by individual forestry finns 
is  crucial  to  the  success  of a  certification  regime,  other  parties  play  an 
important role as well.  Typically, governments of tropical  forested countries 
award concessions to logging firms and hence they  influence whether or not 
logging wilt be undertaken sustainably. Governments may be expected to have 
a broader view on the desirability of forest conservation than individual finns. 
The main reason is  that the government generally remains  the  owner of the 
forests: logging rights are usually awarded only for limited periods of time and 
thus, unlike governments, forestry firms do not take alternative uses of forested 
land into account. The government of a tropical country essentially compares 
the economic benefits of conserving an additional unit of forested land to  the 
economic  benefits  of clearing  that  extra  unit,  including  the  benefits  of 
alternative use.  Based on  such  a  comparison,  the  government may consider 
conversion of part of the forested land to alternative uses to be desirable even if 
sustainable logging is  much more profitable than unsustainable logging  fi'om 
the perspective of individual  firms. Indeed, most tropical countries have land 
use plans indicating  which  rainforest areas  should  remain  forested (either as 
production forests in which logging activities are undertaken on a sustainable 
basis,  or as nature reserves) and which parts of the  rainforest base  should  be 
allocated to alternative land uses (see also Myers, 1994). 
3.  The model 
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individual logging firms, we construct a model which derives the  optimal  rate 
of deforestation from the point of view of the government of a  tropical forested 
country,  taking  into  account  the  decision  process  of  individual  firms. 
Concerning  the  desirability  of sustainable  logging  for  individual  firms,  we 
assume  that  the  resulting  market  situation  after  the  introduction  of  a 
certification regime is  such that all  finns would like to switch to  sustainable 
production techniques.  So basically as an extreme starting point,  we  assume 
that the  finn  level  certification  regime  is  highly  effective.  Each  finn  applies 
sustainable  production  techniques  up  to  the  moment  that  the  government 
decides  that  its  concession  will  not  be  renewed,  thus  inducing  the  f'Lrm to 
switch  to  unsustainable  techniques.  Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the 
government has full control over the  exploitation  of its  forest base: individual 
firms may be induced by  the  introduction  of a  certification  regime  to  apply 
sustainable  logging techniques, but  the  ultimate  decision  which  concessions 
should be cleared for alternative uses is made by the government which is  also 
able  to  put  its  land  allocation  decisions  into  practice.:  Concerning  the 
government's  land  allocation  decision  process,  we  assume  that  it  is  based 
solely on economic considerations 3. 
The  model  used  in  this  paper  captures  the  most  important  economic 
benefits of both deforestation and forest conservation. It is  an extended version 
of the model ofEhui, Hertel and  Preekel (1990).  In their model  it  is  assumed 
that the  government of a  country endowed with rainforests rnaximises  the net 
present value of forest exploitation,  choosing the  optimal  rate of deforestation 
in  each period  and  assuming  perfect  government  control.  Apart  from  some 
simplifications,  we  have  modified their  model  by  taking  into  account  that 
revenues  can be  earned  by  selling  unsustainably  produced  timber  (i.e.  the 
timber extracted from conversion forests), by acknowledging that  the  tropical 
timber market can be segmented in  a  market for sustainably  produced timber 
and a  market for unsustainably  produced timber  and by explicitly  specifying 
all equations. 
The land use decision process of the government is modelled as follows: 
oo 
l'I = maxD~  7t  (  t  )  e  -  r  tdt  (2) 
0 
s.t.  I~(t)=-D(t)  (3) 
n"  (  t  )=Ps  [  7S  F  (  t  )]+Pu  [  (  1 -  )'S  )  D  (t)]+PA  Z(  t  )[  Fo-F  (  t  )]  (4) 
2 This assumption is  clearly  violated  in  reality: rainforests  can  more appropriately  be 
characterized as open access resources than as privately owned resources. However, it can be 
argued that if forestry finns have invested in sustainable logging techniques, the  incentive to 
prevent encroachment by shifting cultivators is increased and hence government control over the 
rainforcst area is increased as well. 
Of course, the reasons for stimulating forest conversion are  not always strictly economic: for 
example, sometimes governments stimulate agricultural colonisation  of their rainforests to relieve 
social pressures elsewhere in the country (Amelung and Diehl, 1992; Repetto and Gillis, 1988). 
These considerations can easily be incorporated in the model, but will be ignored because  they 
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Z  (  t  )  = "Z + o~  D  (  t  ) -  fl  [  Fo -  F  (  t  )  l  (s) 
Equation (2) reflects the assumption that the government maximises  total 
discounted profits of forest exploitation /7 by  choosing the  optimal  rate  of 
deforestation (D,  measured in  units  of land)  in  each period; profits in  each 
period (denoted by 7r(0  ) are discounted at rate r.  Depletion of the forest stock 
is represented by equation (3), the equation of motion:  the  size of the  forest 
stock (F, measured in units of land) falls over time at the rate of deforestation 
D. As can be derived from equation (4), profits in each period arise because of 
three activities.  4 In the first place, profits are earned by logging sustainably the 
entire forest area (F(O), Psdenoting the price at which this type of timber can 
be sold at the international markets and ~  is the fraction of trees which can (on 
average) be harvested sustainably per unit of land in each period.  5 In the second 
place,  profits  are  earned  by  logging  excessively on  land  which  is  to  be 
converted into  agricultural  land  in  the  same  period (D(O); this  'conversion' 
timber can be sold at the international markets  at  price Pv.  The  quantity  of 
timber still  present on such a hectare is  the fraction which  has  not  yet been 
removed under the  sustainable  logging  regime  (1-ys).  Finally,  agricultural 
production also contributes to  national  income:  agricultural  revenues can be 
calculated by  multiplying  the  monetary yield per unit  of land  (the price of 
agricultural products P,~ times the average per unit land productivity Z) by the 
area of land allocated to agriculture (Fo-F(t)). As is reflected in  equation (5), 
land productivity is  not fixed. On the one hand,  deforestation contributes to 
average soil productivity as burning of the forest cover increases  average soil 
productivity  because  of the  release  of nutrients  (Hecht,  1985).  A  freshly 
deforested area is very fertile in the short run, but it can be cultivated for only a 
limited  period of time  as  soil  productivity falls quickly  during  cultivation 
because of nutrients  depletion  (Herrera, Jordan,  Medina  and  Klinge,  1981; 
L6pez and Niklitschek, 1991; eTA, 1984); therefore only current deforestation 
contributes to average soil productivity. On the other hand, the proximity  of 
forest cover increases average soil productivity because it prevents erosion and 
accelerates soil  formation by shedding  organic material  onto  the  fallow land 
(Ehui,  Hertel  and  Preckel,  1990;  Ruthenberg,  1980,  p.  45);  cumulative 
deforestation has a negative effect on average soil productivity. 
The  prices  at  which  each  type  of timber  is  sold  need  some  extra 
clarification:  the  model  differs  between  the  situation  with  and  without 
certification. In a situation without certification, all timber can be sold at the 
same  international  timber market.  Of course, no  actual sustainable  logging 
takes place: the current harvesting is selective logging, in which only the most 
valuable trees are extracted so that the number of trees harvested per hectare is 
4 We ignore production costs and thus profit maximisation coincides with revenue maximisation. 
s This does not imply that an area  is logged every year:  the average  quantity of trees  which is 
harvested per year can be calculated as the total quantity of timber removed in a  rotation cycle 
divided by the length of the rotation. 
Note that we  ignore revenues of other economic benefits from forest conservation, such  as 
revenues of gathering non-wood products (bush-meat, nuts etceteras).  The importance of these 
non-wood  revenues  is  difficult  to  establish,  but  they  can  be  substantial  (see  for  example 
Meijerink, t995). By ignoring them, the subsequent mathematics are  facilitated  but the resulting 
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quite limited too. Hence, in the situation without certification the entire forest 
area is assumed to be logged selectively until  the government decides not  to 
renew the concession contracts;  from the  area to  be  allocated to  agricultural 
land,  all  (commercially  valuable)  timber  is  removed  and  sold  at  the 
international  timber  market￿9 In  the  absence  of a  market  segmentation,  we 
assume that the demand function is downward sloping: 7 
PM =-PM-O  M  l YM  F+(  1 -  YM  )  D  ]  (6) 
In this  demand function,  PM is the maximum price at which tropical timber 
can be sold (in other words, it is the vertical intercept of the inverse demand 
function) and 0M is  the coefficient which  reflects the  amount  with  which  the 
price falls if quantity supplied is increased by one unit.  Furthermore, ~'M is the 
average fraction of timber which is extracted per hectare in each period under a 
selective logging regime.  8 Therefore, in the absence of market segmentation the 
model should be modified by  replacing in  equation  (4)  the  inverse demand 
functions Ps and Pu by PM and also )'s should be replaced with 7M. 
However,  under  a  certification  regime  the  tropical  timber  market  is 
segmented into markets for sustainably  and  unsustainably  produced timber.  9 
The  tropical country's forestry sector will  therefore be  confronted with  two 
different inverse demand equations: 
PS (  F )='Ps-Os(  'YS  F ) 
PU ( D )='Pu-Ou  (1-7S)D 
(7) 
(8) 
Again, we assume the inverse demand  functions to  be  linear and downward 
￿9  10  -  sloping.  Again, in these two equations is  ~,. the maximum price and 0i is the 
coefficient which reflects the  amount  with  which  the  price  falls  if quantity 
supplied is increased by one unit (for i = s, u). 
Finally, we assume that the agricultural sector is  confronted with  a  fixed 
price for the agricultural yield per unit of land (~)." 
In order to derive the optimal long-run (equilibrium) size of the forest area 
and the path towards that equilibrium, the model must be solved by taking the 
appropriate first derivatives of the Hamiltonian of this model: 
7 Barbicr,  Burgess, Bishop and  Aylward  (1994,  p.  43)  present  evidence  that  the  own  price 
elasticity of demand for tropical timber is quite low, so that the demand function can  be assumed 
to be downward sloping. 
s Typically, the fraction of timber extracted  under  selective  logging will be  higher  than  the 
fraction of timber which can be harvested sustainably. Therefore, "tM >"/s. However,  the fraction 
extracted  under  selective  logging will  not exceed  the  fraction  extracted  under  sustainable 
logging by much: current logging practices are  already  highly selective (see for example Grut, 
1990; Lamprecht, 1992; Myers, 1991 and 1994). 
9 See also Mattoo and Singh (1994) and Varangis, Crossley and Braga (1995). 
~0 This specification does not rule out that the two demand functions are  interdependent.  The 
resulting location and slope of the demand functions depend on the degree in which the two types 
of tropical timber are considered to be substitutes by the consumers, just as other materials such 
as temperate timber, aluminum and plastics are (to a certain extent) substitutes for tropical timber 
~ This assumption does not affect the conclusions of the paper, but facilitates the mathematics. CERTIFICATION  OF TROPICAL  TIMBER  AND DEFORESTATION  327 
H  ( D,  F,  A )=[PsD'sF]+  PU [ ( I -  YS) D  ]+PA  Z  [  F  0-F  ]]-3.  D  (9) 
In  this  equation,  3.  is  the  co-state  variable associated with  the  equation  of 
motion: it reflects the marginal value of the state variable (F) at each moment t 
(see for example Kamien and Schwartz,  1981,  pp.  151-153).  This  variable is 
akin to the Lagrange multiplier in  a  static optimisation problem, and can be 
interpreted as the shadow price of an extra unit of forested land. 
Maximising this Hamiltonian yields the following first order conditions: 
A ( t )= ( 1 -  ZS ) PU ( t )+ a  PA [ F0" F ( t )]- 0 U  ( 1 -  ZS )2  D ( t )  (10) 
"A(t) = r~.(t) -  YsPs (t) - fl-PA [F0 -  F(t)l +-fiA Z(t) + OsY.  2 F(t)  (11) 
The  interpretation  of equation  (10)  is  as  follows.  The  marginal  benefits  of 
deforesting a unit of forested land (measured as the sum of the direct revenues of 
deforestation  in  terms  of  timber  sold  and  the  increase  in  agricultural 
productivity arising from that extra unit of land deforested minus  the resulting 
decrease in price at which non-labelled timber can be sold because the demand 
function is assumed to be downward sloping) are equal to the marginal costs of 
deforesting that unit now rather than in the future. Equation (11) is nothing but 
an extended version of the intertemporal non-arbitrage condition  as  stated  by 
Hotelling (1931). To be indifferent between deforesting a unit of land now or in 
the future, the shadow price of the forest stock should increase at rate r, reduced 
by the decision maker's marginal return on  forest conservation  and  increased 
with  the  marginal  benefits of actual  deforestation.  The  marginal  returns  on 
forested land are equal to the revenues which can be earned by logging a unit of 
land  sustainably  (YsPs)  and  the  forests'  contribution  to  average  soil 
productivity (fl-e~(Fo - F)). The benefits of deforesting an extra unit of land are 
the  revenues  earned by  having  an  additional  unit  of land  under  cultivation 
(PAZ) and the increase in revenues of sustainably produced timber (because of 
......  2  12  the increase m xts price resulting from the decrease m supply; Os Ys F). 
4. Results 
On the basis of the equation of motion  (3) and the first order conditions  (10) 
and (11),  together with  the inverse demand functions for timber  (equations  7 
and 8  in  the case of certification, equation 6  in  the  absence of a  certification 
regime), the model can be solved.  The  equilibrium  size of the rainforest area 
can be found by setting  the time derivatives (P  and  ;t)  equal  to  zero.  The 
resulting equilibrium forest size under a certification regime (Fc*) is presented 
in equation (12): 
F~  (-fia-Z+r(l-  ys)'fiu + y'2OxFo -  Ts~(O) I 
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By  analysing  equation  (12),  it  becomes  clear whether  or not  a  certification 
regime will have a positive  influence on the equilibrium  size of the rainforest 
area. 13  It is  likely that the  denominator of the  second term on the right  hand 
side of the equation is positive:  even if fl is  very low relative to  tx  (that is,  if 
the negative effect of cumulative  deforestation on  average  soil  productivity  is 
very small relative to the positive influence of current deforestation on average 
soil  productivity), the fact that the  demand function for sustainably  produced 
timber  is  downward  sloping  implies  that  the  denominator  is  likely  to  be 
positive (Os is positive). Also, the higher fl relative to ct,  the more likely it  is 
that the optimal forest size is close to the initial forest size. 
The numerator of the second term on the RHS  of equation (12) reflects the 
weighing of the benefits of deforesting the  first unit  of land and the benefits of 
managing it  sustainably.  Concerning the  decision  of an  individual  firm,  we 
have  assumed  that  it  finds  it  advantageous  to  switch  to  sustainable  forest 
management. This means that initially the present value of sustainable  logging 
(TsPs(O)/r)  exceeds  the  one-shot  revenues  of unsustainable  logging,  (1-ys) 
v. However, the government also takes the present value of alternative uses of 
land into account ( -fiA Z-/r) and the effect of deforesting the first unit of land on 
the price of sustainably produced timber  as a  result of the downward  sloping 
2  demand function (ys OsFo/r). It is  likely that the addition  of these  two  terms 
results in a positive value of the numerator of the term and thus  at least some 
F"  deforestation is desirable: the equilibrium size of the rainforest area (  c  ) is less 
than  the  initial  size  (Fo),  even  though  switching  to  sustainable  production 
techniques is profitable for all individual firms) 4 
It is  generally argued that a  necessary condition for rainforest conservation 
is  that  the  economic  benefits  of tropical  rainforest  conservation  should  be 
increased  relative  to  the  economic benefit  of deforestation  (see  for  example 
Barbier, Burgess, Bishop, and Aylward, 1994; Burgess,  1994; Vincent,  1990). 
Equation (12)  suggests  that this  argument is  indeed  valid:  a  decrease  of the 
vertical intercept  of the  inverse  demand  function  for unsustainably  produced 
tropical timber ( e v) or an increase of the vertical price intercept of sustainably 
produced timber (Ps) leads to a larger long-run forest base, 
Having derived that it is likely that at least some deforestation is  desirable, 
the question now is  how the  government should deplete the forest base up to 
its  long-run equilibrium  size in  an optimal  way. The  depletion paths  can be 
calculated by taking the time derivative of the co-state variable ~, (equation 10), 
inserting the result together with the equation of motion (5) into  equation (11) 
and solving the resulting second order differential equation (Apostol, 1967, pp. 
322-328): 15 
13 Solving the maximisation problem in the absence of a certification regime yields an expression 
of the equilibrium size similar to equation (12); the resulting equation is presented in Appendix 1. 
14 Ehui and Hertel (1989) have applied the original Ehui, Hertel and Preekel (1990) model to 
estimate the optimal size of the rainforest area of Ivory Coast. For reasonable  ~alues of the 
different parameters, they find that some deforestation is desirable from the point of view of 
governments of tropical countries. Since we modified their model by explicitly including the 
revenues earned by selling conversion timber, it can safely be assumed that in our model the 
initial size of the forests is suboptimally large from the point of view of governments of tropical 
countries. Ehui and  Hertel (1989) also find that because of tbe  contribution of forests  to 
agricultural productivity, rainforests arc not likely to disappear entirely. 
The depletion path in the absence of a certification regime is similar to equation (13); see CERTIFICATION  OF TROPICAL  TIMBER  AND DEFORESTATION  329 
+  2(l_rs)ZOu  -lr  t  +F~  (13) 
Depending on the parameter values of the resulting inverse demand fimctions 
under  certification relative  to  the  parameter  values  of the  inverse  demand 
function in the absence of a certification regime (the current situation), the rate 
of deforestation can increase or decrease. Although it does not play a  role in 
determining  the  long-run  equilibrium  size  of  the  rainforest  area  under  a 
certification  regime,  the  price  elasticity  of  the  demand  function  f~ 
unsustainably produced timber does affect the rate at which forests are depleted. 
Taking  the  first derivative of equation (13)  with  respect  to  0u,  a  positive 
relationship is  found: the lower 0u (that is,  the higher the  price elasticity of 
demand),~Uthe  lower the  forest stock  in  each period (Fc(t)).  The  intuition 
behind  this  result  is  that  if the  elasticity is  high,  a  sharp  increase  in  the 
quantity of timber sold does not lead to a large fall in its price. In other words, 
the cost of increasing the supply of unsustainably produced timber in terms of 
the decrease in the price at which the entire stock of that type of timber can be 
sold,  falls if the  demand  elasticity increases.  Thus,  if the  price elasticity of 
demand for unsustainably produced timber turns out to be  high  enough  after 
the introduction of a  certification regime relative to  the  elasticity before the 
adoption of the certification regime (that is,  if ou is  small  enough relative to 
ou), it becomes profitable for governments of tropical countries to increase the 
instantaneous rate of deforestation. This  can also  be  shown  graphically;  see 
Figure 1. 
In this  figure three depletion paths are depicted. Apart from the  depletion 
path in the absence of a certification regime, two depletion paths are drawn for 
different values of the price elasticity of demand. As is  clear from this  figure, if 
the price elasticity of the demand for conversion timber turns out to be lower 
than in the absence of a certification regime (ou>ou), 17 a certification regime is 
unambiguously preferable: in each period the  size of the  forest area is  larger 
under a  certification regime  than  without  such  a  regime.  However,  if the 
elasticity of the  demand  for unsustainably  produced timber is  high  enough 
(ov<<oM), the long-run equilibrium forest area under a certification regime still 
exceeds the equilibrium forest size without such a regime, but in the short and 
medium run deforestation rates may be higher. 
Appendix 2. 
~6 The price elasticity  of demand is dyP__ (see for example Varian, 1992, p. 253). Hence, the 
dP y 
lower 0, the higher the price elasticity  of the demand function. 
7  Note that as a benchmark OM is set equal to 1. 330  DAAN P. VAN SOEST AND CATRINUS J. JEPMA 
Parameter values:  "Ps=60, 0s=l.I,  "eu=35, "PM=50,  0r~=l,  "PA=22.5, ys=0.4, yM=0.5, r=0.15, or=0.3, 
[~=0.04,  Z  =1, Fo=24. 
Figure  1.  Comparison  between  the optimal depletion  paths with  and  without  certification,  for 
0u=0.1 and 0u=l.l 
The adoption of a certification regime thus ensures that the size of the rainforest 
area is increased in the long run relative to the case in which no segmentation 
is  introduced, but that in the short  and  medium  term instantaneous  rates  of 
deforestation may  increase.  Of course,  whether  the  depletion  trade-off will 
actually occur depends on the demand functions  after the  introduction of the 
regime: both the relative magnitudes of the price elasticities (0M, 0s and 0v) and 
the size of the 'green premium' prove to be important. 
First we consider the influence of the relative sizes of the price elasticity of 
the original demand function (that is,  the demand function for tropical timber 
before certification) and  the  price elasticities  of demand  for  sustainably  and 
unsustainably  produced timber.  Table  1  gives  the  number  of periods  after 
which the forest size under a certification scheme is larger than in the absence of 
certification, for different values of 0s and  0u.  In  other words,  the  number  of 
periods are calculated at which the depletion path under a certification regime 
intersects the depletion path which occurs without such a regime, as depicted 
in Figure 1. 
As  is  clear from this  table, an adverse short-term result will  only occur if 
the demand function for unsustainably produced timber turns out to  be  more 
elastic than the demand function in  the absence of a  certification regime. The 
higher the elasticity of demand for non-labelled timber (i.e.  the lower 0u), the 
larger the benefits of current deforestation because an increase in D leads only to 
a  small  fall  in  Pv.  But  the  price  elasticity  of  the  demand  function  for 
sustainably produced timber also plays a role: the more inelastic the demand 
function for sustainably produced timber (the higher 0s), the more the benefits CERTIFICATION  OF TROPICAL  TIMBER  AND DEFORESTATION  331 
of current  deforestation  increase because the  resulting  decrease in  supply  cf 
sustainably produced timber leads to a sharp increase in Ps, and hence the more 
likely it is that the depletion trade-off will occur. 
Table 1. Number  of periods for which Fc(0 is less than FM(0, for different combinations of the 
price elasticity  of demand for sustainably produced and unsustainably produced timber 





1.22  1.49  1.88 
0.79  1.17  1.67 
0  0.1  0.89 
0  0  0 
Parameter values: Ps=60,  Pu=35,  PM=50,  OM=I, PA=22.5, ~'s=0.4, "1~=0.5, r=0.15, or=0.3, 
1~=0.04, Z =1, Fo=24. 
The  second important precondition for the occurrence of the  depletion 
trade-off is that the 'green premium' should  not  be too  high.  Basically,  two 
premia can be discerned (see also Varangis, Crossley and Braga,  1995).  In the 
first  place,  there  is  the  difference  between  the  price  at  which  sustainably 
produced timber can be sold and the price  of unsustainably  produced timber 
(Ps-eu).  In the  second  place,  there  is  the  difference  between  the  price 
sustainably produced timber and the price at which timber was sold before the 
adoption  of certification  (es-~M).  Table  2  gives  the  number  of periods  for 
which short term deforestation is higher under certification than in the absence 
of a  certification regime for different  values  of the  vertical  intercepts  of the 
inverse demand  fimctions of certified and  non-certified timber  (note  that  the 
analysis  is  undertaken  keeping  the  location  of the  original  inverse  demand 
function Pu fixed at ~M=50). 
Table 2. Number  of periods for which Fc(t) is less than F~(0 for different combinations of Ps 





Ps=60  Ps=65  Ps=70 
2.65  1.02  0.50 
1.88  0.88  0.41 
1.52  0.76  0.31 
Parameter values: 0s=l.I,  0u=0.1, PM=50, 0u=l,  PA=22.5, 7s=0.4, "yM=0.5, r=0.15, Or=0.3, 
1~=0.04, Z =1, Fo=24. 
The results presented  in  this  table  show  that  for both  definitions  of the 
'green premium', an increase in the premium will reduce the likelihood that the 332  DAAN P. VAN SOEST  AND CATRINUS J. JEPMA 
trade-offwill occur. The reason is that an increase in both price gaps increases 
the optimal long-run size of the  rainforest area by  increasing the  benefits of 
forest conservation relative to  deforestation. If this  increase is  large enough, 
desired cumulative deforestation is reduced and the resulting  rate  of deforest- 
ation in each period will necessarily be smaller. In sum, the higher the price of 
sustainably produced timber relative to the price before certification and  also 
the  higher the  price of sustainably  produced timber  relative to  the  price  of 
unsustainably  produced  timber,  the  shorter  the  period  in  which  short-rtm 
deforestation rates will  be  higher  with  certification than  in  the  absence  of 
certification. 
Thus, it can be concluded that if the 'green premium' is not too large and if 
the elasticity of the demand function for non-certified timber is  large enough, 
the international community should be cautious with introducing a micro level 
certification regime because it may speed up rather than retard deforestation in 
the short and medium run. 
5.  The likelihood of the depletion trade-off 
The  main  stimulus  for  sustainability  created  by  the  introduction  of  a 
certification regime  is  the  positive  price  gap  which  will  arise  after  the 
introduction of a certification regime. The extent of this gap will be limited by 
the possibilities  of substitution (Varangis, Crossley and Braga,  1995,  Annex 
1). If for a particular type of use there are many alternatives for tropical timber 
(such as temperate timber, plastics or aluminium),  a significant price increase 
is not likely to occur after the  introduction of a  certification regime because 
demand will  shift to  alternative  materials;  unsustainably  produced  tropical 
timber will generally be sold in markets with a high elasticity of demand. A 
survey conducted by Barbier, Burgess, Bishop and Aylward (1994, pp.  52-53) 
confirms this  hypothesis: manufacturers believe that there is  scope for a  price 
premium only in the high quality  product markets  (such as  the  markets  fer 
quality joinery and furniture) while  in  markets  where there are many  close 
substitutes  for  tropical  timber  (such  as  the  construction  industry  where 
temperate timber and non-wood products can be used) they do not see much 
room for a premium. 
There is also some evidence on the size of the price gap resulting from the 
introduction of a certification regime. Surveys of the research as presented by 
Barbier,  Burgess,  Bishop  and  Aylward  (1994,  pp.  55-56)  and  Varangis, 
Crossley and Braga (1995) indicate that there is no unambiguous evidence that 
the price gap between the price of sustainably produced timber and the price of 
timber before the adoption of a certification regime (that  is,  Ps- PM)  will  be 
sizeable. Several surveys  ~8 indicate that consumers will only be prepared to pay 
a  moderate  premium  for  sustainably  produced  timber:  in  most  cases  this 
premium is  less than  10%  while  the  majority  of the  respondents  would be 
prepared to  pay a  premium between  I  and  5%. 19  However,  there  is  some 
evidence that consumers in Western countries may be willing to abstain from 
~s FOE (1992), Milland Fine Timber Ltd. (1990), MORI and WWF  (1991), Winterhatter and 
Cassens (1993). See also ESE (1992) and Haji Gazali and Simula (1994). 
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purchasing non-certified timber, thus  leading to  an  increase  in  the  difference 
between the price of sustainably and unsustainably produced timber ( Ps- P t~). 
6.  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In this paper we have analysed the consequences of the introduction of a finn 
level certification regime on the resulting long-term size of the rainforest base 
and on the depletion path. Assuming that loggers cannot autonomously choose 
to apply sustainable forestry techniques (the government decides whether the 
concession area is  designated as permanent forest or as conversion forest), we 
find that in the long run such a certification regime will lead to more overall 
forest  conservation  but  that  the  depletion  path  along  which  this  higher 
equilibrium forest size is  reached can become steeper, thus  leading to  faster 
deforestation in the short run.  This  depletion trade-off may occur if the  price 
elasticity of demand for unsustainably produced timber  turns  out  to  be high 
relative to the price elasticity of the original demand function and if the 'green 
premium' tums out to be small. 
Surveys among  consumers  and  producers  indicate  that  there  is  indeed 
reason for concern. Although the price of sustainably produced timber is  likely 
to exceed the price of unsustainably produced timber so that certification will 
have a positive long-run effect on forest conservation, on empirical grounds the 
possibility of an increase in short-run rates of deforestation cannot be excluded: 
the price elasticity of demand for unsustainably produced timber is  likely to 
exceed the price elasticity of demand for certified timber, and the gap between 
the price of certified timber and the original timber price is  not  likely to  be 
substantial. 
To conclude there is indeed reason for a careful introduction of certification. 
The  policy  implication  is  that  apart  from  monitoring  the  activities  of 
individual  firms, also the  decisions  of the  government of a  tropical  forested 
country should be included in the certification regime. For instance, the price 
received by  individual  logging  firms  for sustainable  timber might  be made 
dependent on the overall rate of deforestation occurring in  that  country, thus 
inducing its govemment to decrease the rate at which forested land is  allocated 
to  alternative use.  Another instrument  may be  to  set  a  minimum  price for 
sustainably  produced timber.  The  incentives given  to  the  government  of a 
tropical forested country  are  then  as  follows.  Given  the  fact  that  under  a 
minimum price system in the certified timber market a decrease in the supply 
of certified timber (resulting from increased deforestation) would not lead to an 
increase in the sales price of certified timber as long as the market price would 
be  lower than  the  minimum  price,  an  important  stimulus  to  increase  the 
instantaneous  rate  of  land  conversion  is  reduced:  the  extra  benefit  of 
deforestation in  terms  of the  increase  in  the  price  of sustainably  produced 
timber is removed. 
The applicability of this  model in terms of policy advise is hampered by 
the fact that in  order to be able to  solve the  model,  strong  assumptions  are 
needed: especially the assumption of full land use control by the governments 
of  tropical forested countries is violated in reality. However, the insights  this 
model gives remain valid: governments of tropical forested countries should be 
given appropriate incentives to  pursue  forest conservation because otherwise 334  DAAN P. VAN SOEST AND CATRINUS J. JEPMA 
market  incentives  can  be  thus  that  deforestation  rates  increase  rather  than 
decrease in the short and medium run. 
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Appendix  1 
The  equilibrium  size of the  rainforest area in  the  absence of certification is 
derived by combining the equation of motion (3), the first order conditions (10 
and 11),  the inverse demand function (6) and by setting the  time  derivatives 
equal to zero. The resulting size of the rainforest area without certification (Fu') 
is: 
=r0-  l.  (2fl_rt~)_~a+2OMYM(YM_r(l_~M))  j  (AI) 
The  similarities  with  the  equilibrium  size  of  the  rainforest  area  under 
certification (Fc",  equation  12) are that again in the numerator of the  second 
term on the RHS  the net present value of the benefits of deforesting the  first 
unit of land are weighed against the net present value of the benefits of logging 
it selectively. The discounted benefits of selective logging are ~,MPM(O)/r;  the 
discounted  benefits  of deforesting  it  are  the  one-shot  timber  revenues  (1- 
~)PM(O) plus the present value of the  agricultural  revenues  Pa z/r  plus  the 
effect on  the  price  (the  movement  along  the  demand  equation).  This  last 
component is more complicated than in equation (12) as both changes in the 
supply of selectively logged timber and conversion timber affect the price in the 
future. Deforesting the first unit of forest implies that in the future there is  less 
supply of sustainably logged timber, resulting in  an increase in  its price: the 
discounted benefits of deforesting the first unit  of land  arising  from the  price 
increase are y~OuFo/r. On the other hand, the additional timber extracted from 
a hectare which is to be converted to agricultural use results in a decrease in the 
price  at  which  total  timber  supply  can  be  sold:  the  price  falls  with  (1- 
~M)~MOMFo.  The denominator again acts as a multiplier. 
Numerical  simulations  show  that  if the  inverse  demand  function  for 
sustainably  produced timber  is  not  too  different  from  the  original  inverse 
demand function, Fc" is  larger than FM*: this  holds for a  very wide  range of 
parameter values. CERTIFICATION  OF TROPICAL TIMBER AND DEFORESTATION  335 
Appendix  2 
The depletion path in the absence of a  certification regime is as follows: 
FM(t)= (Fo -F;d)EXP -  r 2 +  2(I_TM)20M  2 r 
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